Honderich and the Curse of Epiphenomenalism

Honderich and the Curse of Epiphenomenalism

Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 13 numbers 7-8, 2006, pp61-77

Stephen Law

In Radical Externalism, Ted Honderich offers an ingenious and radical new solution to the problem of consciousness – a solution that promises, among other things, to do justice to two important features of consciousness – to both its subjectivity and its causal efficacy.

According to Honderich, the main alternatives to his own radical externalism are certain forms of dualism, or, as he puts it, “spiritualism”, and “devout physicalism”. Honderich’s central argument for radical externalism is that it succeeds in respecting those features of consciousness to which these two main alternatives fail to do justice. It is, therefore, the superior theory.

But is radical externalism superior? Does it have this advantage over its two main rivals?

I don’t believe it does. The central argument of this paper is that radical externalism falls foul of much the same kinds of problems concerning causal interaction that plague spiritualism. Indeed, ironically, it turns out that radical externalism is vulnerable to a similar objection to that which Honderich himself cleverly levelled again anomalous monism almost a quarter century ago.

But before we get to that objection, let’s begin by briefly outlining what Honderich takes to be the two main alternatives to his own theory – spiritualism and devout materialism – and examining their alleged failings.

Animation script

INTRODUCTORY SEQUENCE

LIVE ACTION: CAMP THESPIAN SITTING IN VELVET ARMCHAIR IN LIBRARY, WITH HUGE LEATHER BOUND BOOK. ROARING FIRE AND SIDE-TABLE. SPOOKILY LIT AMID DARKNESS BY SPOTLIGHT. BIT LIKE OPENING OF ROCKY HORROR PICTURE SHOW.

THE NARRATOR [WE SLOWLY ZOOM IN]: Ah, you’ve arrived. Welcome! Welcome to The Philosophy Files! – where we encounter some of the greatest mysteries of all!

FLUFFY WHITE CAT (ANIMATED?) APPEARS ON MANTELPIECE AND TEETERS ALONG IT.

But be warned. Thinking philosophically can be disturbing – frightening even. We’re going to be thinking without a safety net. [CAT SLIPS, SAVES ITSELF] Indeed, we will often be teetering on the very edge of sanity! [CAT FALLS OFF MANTELPIECE – CRASH!]

For we’re embarking upon a journey, a journey into the unknown – a journey to… the Outer Limits of thought. [SCREEN GOES TO INTERFERENCE] THAN SHRINKS TO POINT AND VANISHES LEAVING DARK SCREEN, LIKE IN OLD TWILIGHT ZONE SHOW [MAYBE PLAY TWILIGHT ZONE THEME?]

THE NARRATOR: Allow me to introduce…the philosopher!

Five Private Language Arguments (International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12, no. 2 (2004))

Abstract

This paper distinguishes five key interpretations of the argument presented by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations I, §258. I also argue that on none of these five interpretations is the argument cogent. The paper is primarily concerned with the most popular interpretation of the argument: that which that makes it rest upon the principle that one can be said to follow a rule only if there exists a “useable criterion of successful performance” (Pears) or “operational standard of correctness” (Glock) for its correct application. This principle, I suggest, is untrue. The private language argument upon which it rests therefore fails.

FIVE PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS

Section §258 of Part I of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (henceforth PI §258) is one of the best-known and most controversial passages of that book. Many philosophers - including Malcolm Budd, John Canfeild, Hans-Johann Glock, P.M.S. Hacker, Paul Johnston, Anthony Kenny, Norman Malcolm, Marie McGinn and David Pears - claim to discern within PI §258 and the surrounding text a powerful argument against the possibility of a necessarily private language. Others dismiss the argument, typically on the grounds that it is verificationist.

My aim in this paper is twofold. The first aim is clarity. The dispute over whether the private language argument of PI §258 is cogent has been confused by the fact there are now five main interpretations of PI §258 currently on offer, each interpretation presenting a fundamentally different argument. I will set out and distinguish clearly all five private language arguments. My second aim is to explain why none of these arguments is, as it stands, cogent.

I begin by setting out what all the commentators discussed in this paper believe to be the target of PI §258: the suggestion that one might possess a necessarily private language.

Systems of Measurement (Ratio, Vol. 18, pp. 145-164, June 2005 )

Systems of Measurement


Wittgenstein and Kripke disagree about the status of the proposition: the Standard Metre is one metre long. Wittgenstein believes it is necessary. Kripke argues that it is contingent. Kripke’s argument depends crucially on a certain sort of thought-experiment with which we are invited to test our intuitions about what is and isn’t necessary. In this paper I argue that, while Kripke’s conclusion is strictly correct, nevertheless similar Kripke-style thought experiments indicate that the metric system of measurement is after all relative in something like the way Wittgenstein seems to think. Central to this paper is a thought-experiment I call The Smedlium Case.