PLANTINGA'S BELIEF-CUM-DESIRE ARGUMENT REFUTED

PLANTINGA’S BELIEF-CUM-DESIRE ARGUMENT REFUTED
Stephen Law

FORTHCOMING IN RELIGIOUS STUDIES. NOTE THAT CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS NOW OWN COPYRIGHT.

Abstract

In Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga develops an argument designed to show that naturalism is self-defeating. One component of this larger argument is what I call Plantinga’s belief-cum-desire argument, which is intended to establish something more specific: that if the content of our beliefs does causally effect behaviour (that is to say, semantic content is not epiphenomenal), and if naturalism and current evolutionary doctrine are correct, then the probability that we possess reliable cognitive mechanisms must be either inscrutable or low. This paper aims to refute Plantinga’s belief-cum-desire argument.

THE EVIL GOD CHALLENGE - forthcoming in Religious Studies

POSTSCRIPT:

My Paper "The Evil God Challenge" is now available online at the CUP journals page http://journals.cambridge.org/repo_A72V8TEm

This is the final, published version, appearing in Religious Studies shortly. PDF VERSION.

THE EVIL GOD CHALLENGE

Stephen Law

NB Note COPYRIGHT RESTS WITH CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. This is forthcoming in Religious Studies.

Abstract


This paper develops a challenge to theism. The challenge is to explain why the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and all-good god should be considered significantly more reasonable than the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and all-evil god. Theists typically dismiss the evil god hypothesis out of hand because of the problem of good – there is surely too much good in the world for it to be the creation of such a being. But then why doesn’t the problem of evil provide equally good grounds for dismissing belief in a good god? I develop this evil god challenge in detail, anticipate several replies, and correct errors made in earlier discussions of the problem of good.