tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5374599110729337991.post2391231204413212391..comments2023-03-27T01:13:03.798-07:00Comments on Stephen Law - papers: Five Private Language Arguments (International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12, no. 2 (2004))Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5374599110729337991.post-66690906647035975802013-09-09T03:08:22.330-07:002013-09-09T03:08:22.330-07:00Hi Kim Tullar
Your post's are extremely good....Hi Kim Tullar<br /><br />Your post's are extremely good...just demonstrates that Cherwell school (and it's students) deserve to be classed as outstanding!<br /><br />Dr Law, I think PI §258 is quite clear.<br /><br />What Wittgenstein is referring to here are two things:<br /><br />1/ Familiar Memory.<br /><br />2/ Retrospective Memory.<br /><br />In humans, "Familiar Memory" is instinctive, i.e. it is pre-cognitive rule following...this is how humans learn skills.<br /><br />Retrospective Memory on the other hand is cognitive, one uses it to build up a cohesive picture of the world...it is at this point that whether ones memory is correct or not matters.<br /><br />Wittgenstein's point is that it is illusory to be concerned if one is right or wrong about a sensation in the first instance.<br /><br />For example, you are walking down a crowded city street...as you are walking a sudden thought strikes you that you have just passed someone you know...just like a reflex...This is an example of a Familiar Memory.<br /><br />You then decide to turn around and walk up to the person who you thought you recognised...It is only when you are with them that you use Retrospective Memory to ascertain whether it really is a person you know or not, i.e. shape of nose, hair colour, eye colour, etc...<br /><br />So, Wittgenstein is correct...in the first instance of the sense of seeing someone, one may or may not know...the idea that this is right or wrong doesn't come into it...<br />Philip Randhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09143527524267821692noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5374599110729337991.post-45321709190860354162012-10-22T13:04:28.876-07:002012-10-22T13:04:28.876-07:00An attempted counter-argument could be as follows:...An attempted counter-argument could be as follows: A check can be made if it is assumed sensations have qualities which can be described in terms other than sensations. If so, these terms can be recorded, and therefore referred back to easily. Therefore, instead of using “S”, we may use “sharp, tingly”, and then refer back to memories which similarly exhibit these qualities.<br /><br />This argument suffers due to its use describing sensations via things other than sensations – it begs the question.<br /><br />Another attempted counter-argument: When we have a specific sensation S, mark it in our memory – “draw a ring round it in our memory”. Now, when we have a new sensation K, let us feel the current sensation K, and then feel the previous sensation S which can identify itself through the ring drawn around it in our memory. We can check if our sensations are the same. <br /><br />If we can re-experience sensations via memory, this argument would appear sound; however, its problems arise due to line “mark it in our memory”. Of course this is a subtle way of proposing we signify it, and therefore the argument begs the question. It is possible to go back to a memory of a sensation U and check if K is the same as that sensation, but U is just some random sensation you have gone back to.<br /><br />To conclude, an illustration. I experience a sensation S today, and record in a book the exact time, place and situation in which it occurred. I record all the details of the context possible. Tomorrow, I wish to remember what S was, perhaps so I can check a different sensation with S. I look back in my book, see the context, and attempt to go back in my memory to S. I find I cannot. Why? Because the memory of S is detached from the memories of the context. Knowing the context tells you nothing of the qualities of S, nor does it point you to any space in your mind around which a group of memories, including S and the context, exist. Therefore, Wittgenstein was right in saying that when we undertake such an exercise, all we result in finding is a term such as “happiness” which stems only from its use in a language-game.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5374599110729337991.post-80154396244777000202012-10-22T13:04:06.310-07:002012-10-22T13:04:06.310-07:00Hello Stephen;
I'm taking philosophy at Cherw...Hello Stephen;<br /><br />I'm taking philosophy at Cherwell school, and due to my interest, have engaged myself somewhat with Wittgenstein. In doing so I have read some of Anthony Kenny's book, and this article (your website being a highly useful source in general on philosophy). As a result, I believe I may have spotted a mistake in your approach to Kenny's argument, which I shall attempt to explain.<br /><br />As you rightly say, Kenny's argument hinges upon the notion of recalling a sensation. Let us give an example: you are currently experiencing K and wish to check if K = S which was signified by you as "S" yesterday. At this point in time, you cannot remember what "S" signified exactly (cannot remember S), but can remember the notation "S". So, you are attempting to check whether K, which you know, equals something of which you have no clue! It is impossible! Now, it would be plausible to go through memories and check whether they were K or not. However, it is impossible to know whether these K's are the same as the intended S.<br /><br />It is slightly unsatisfying for me to leave my argument like this, so I shall expand slightly. Firstly, although we do not know what "S" was intended to signify, we can guess what it was intended to stand for. Let us say we guess "S" to signify Q, where Q is a sensation which may or may not be S. Clearly in the act of guessing we are unsure of what "S" actually signifies. Therefore, at that point in time, if we asked ourselves "what does "S" signify?" we must admit that we cannot answer with any certainty. We do not know what "S" equals, but we may think we know, or guess. So what if we say that we are "reliable" and that the chance of us guessing right is very high? Even so, we, nor anyone else, will ever know whether our choice of what "S" signifies was right. Therefore the use is merely a matter of chance, and so clearly not a definition.<br /><br />The wider point here is that reliability breaks down when no one can ever make a check on the thing which should be reliable. When no check can be made, the thing may or may not be true, as dictated by chance. It is nonsensical to call someone a reliable user if their use is dictated purely by chance. In the example of the prisoner, let us say he created the “!” notation to record rats yesterday. The next day he wakes up, and looks at the notation. He does not immediately know what it means. He consults his memory. He finds that he remembers seeing lots of rats, but also lots of prison guards. He may mistake the “!” notation to mean seeing a prison guard. Mistakes changing the meaning may happen many times. However, this example, and allegory in general, is slightly misleading, as some checks can be made by the prisoner. For instance, instead of using a “!”, the prisoner could draw a rat. Here, there is a similarity between the two different visual senses – the drawn rat and the real rat. Both look very similar and share the same form. But with sensations, there is no possible way of constructing any interior symbol which can share the same form or a similar one as a sensation. Therefore, no check can be made.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5374599110729337991.post-24316336501237049752012-10-15T15:00:56.438-07:002012-10-15T15:00:56.438-07:00Another attempted counter-argument: When we have a...Another attempted counter-argument: When we have a specific sensation S, mark it in our memory – “draw a ring round it in our memory”. Now, when we have a new sensation K, let us feel the current sensation K, and then feel the previous sensation S which can identify itself through the ring drawn around it in our memory. We can check if our sensations are the same. <br /><br />If we can re-experience sensations via memory, this argument would appear sound; however, its problems arise due to line “mark it in our memory”. Of course this is a subtle way of proposing we signify it, and therefore the argument begs the question. It is possible to go back to a memory of a sensation U and check if K is the same as that sensation, but U is just some random sensation you have gone back to.<br /><br />To conclude, an illustration. I experience a sensation S today, and record in a book the exact time, place and situation in which it occurred. I record all the details of the context possible. Tomorrow, I wish to remember what S was, perhaps so I can check a different sensation with S. I look back in my book, see the context, and attempt to go back in my memory to S. I find I cannot. Why? Because the memory of S is detached from the memories of the context. Knowing the context tells you nothing of the qualities of S, nor does it point you to any space in your mind around which a group of memories, including S and the context, exist. Therefore, Wittgenstein was right in saying that when we undertake such an exercise, all we result in finding is a term such as “happiness” which stems only from its use in a language-game.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5374599110729337991.post-51925435360063603542012-10-15T15:00:33.318-07:002012-10-15T15:00:33.318-07:00Hello Stephen;
I'm taking philosophy at Cherw...Hello Stephen;<br /><br />I'm taking philosophy at Cherwell school, and due to my interest, have engaged myself somewhat with Wittgenstein. In doing so I have read some of Anthony Kenny's book, and this article (your website being a highly useful source in general on philosophy). As a result, I believe I may have spotted a mistake in your approach to Kenny's argument, which I shall attempt to explain.<br /><br />As you rightly say, Kenny's argument hinges upon the notion of recalling a sensation. Let us give an example: you are currently experiencing K and wish to check if K = S which was signified by you as "S" yesterday. At this point in time, you cannot remember what "S" signified exactly (cannot remember S), but can remember the notation "S". So, you are attempting to check whether K, which you know, equals something of which you have no clue! It is impossible! Now, it would be plausible to go through memories and check whether they were K or not. However, it is impossible to know whether these K's are the same as the intended S.<br /><br />It is slightly unsatisfying for me to leave my argument like this, so I shall expand slightly. Firstly, although we do not know what "S" was intended to signify, we can guess what it was intended to stand for. Let us say we guess "S" to signify Q, where Q is a sensation which may or may not be S. Clearly in the act of guessing we are unsure of what "S" actually signifies. Therefore, at that point in time, if we asked ourselves "what does "S" signify?" we must admit that we cannot answer with any certainty. We do not know what "S" equals, but we may think we know, or guess. So what if we say that we are "reliable" and that the chance of us guessing right is very high? Even so, we, nor anyone else, will ever know whether our choice of what "S" signifies was right. Therefore the use is merely a matter of chance, and so clearly not a definition.<br /><br />The wider point here is that reliability breaks down when no one can ever make a check on the thing which should be reliable. When no check can be made, the thing may or may not be true, as dictated by chance. It is nonsensical to call someone a reliable user if their use is dictated purely by chance. In the example of the prisoner, let us say he created the “!” notation to record rats yesterday. The next day he wakes up, and looks at the notation. He does not immediately know what it means. He consults his memory. He finds that he remembers seeing lots of rats, but also lots of prison guards. He may mistake the “!” notation to mean seeing a prison guard. Mistakes changing the meaning may happen many times. However, this example, and allegory in general, is slightly misleading, as some checks can be made by the prisoner. For instance, instead of using a “!”, the prisoner could draw a rat. Here, there is a similarity between the two different visual senses – the drawn rat and the real rat. Both look very similar and share the same form. But with sensations, there is no possible way of constructing any interior symbol which can share the same form or a similar one as a sensation. Therefore, no check can be made.<br /><br />An attempted counter-argument could be as follows: A check can be made if it is assumed sensations have qualities which can be described in terms other than sensations. If so, these terms can be recorded, and therefore referred back to easily. Therefore, instead of using “S”, we may use “sharp, tingly”, and then refer back to memories which similarly exhibit these qualities.<br /><br />This argument suffers due to its use describing sensations via things other than sensations – it begs the question.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5374599110729337991.post-64362810362213206852011-02-12T01:55:45.948-08:002011-02-12T01:55:45.948-08:00you are doing a great work. keep it up. you just i...you are doing a great work. keep it up. you just inspired meSusan Omo-Udoyohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03654958515340711147noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5374599110729337991.post-13279756753355756082008-07-23T09:40:00.000-07:002008-07-23T09:40:00.000-07:00Hey Stephen - don't break a leg - it was excellent...Hey Stephen - don't break a leg - it was excellent to have attended your course on Wittgenstein's Investigations at Oxford recently...top notch!<BR/><BR/>You are of course somewhat misguided regarding the plausibility of 'private rule following'! <BR/><BR/>But more on this shortly - take it easy, BenBen Bousquethttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10423050088087968129noreply@blogger.com