Skeptical Theism and Skepticism About The External World and Past (Philosophy - Supplement 81 on Religious Epistemology, 2017)

 

Skeptical Theism and Skepticism About The External World and Past (Philosophy - Supplement 81 on Religious Epistemology, 2017)

ABSTRACT: Skeptical theism is a popular - if not universally theistically endorsed - response to the evidential problem of evil. Sceptical theists question how we can be in a position to know God lacks God-justifying reason to allow the evils we observe. In this paper I examine a criticism of sceptical theism: that the sceptical theists scepticism re divine reasons entails that, similarly, we cannot know God lacks God-justifying reason to deceive us about the external world and the past. This in turn seems to supply us with a defeater for all our beliefs regarding the external world and past? Critics argue that either the sceptical theist abandon their sceptical theism, thereby resurrecting the evidential argument from evil, or else they must embrace seemingly absurd sceptical consequences, including scepticism about the external world and past. I look at various sceptical theist responses to this critique and find them all wanting.

 

1. Skeptical Theism

 

Evidential arguments from evil often take something like the following form:

 

If God exists, gratuitous evil does not exist.

Gratuitous evil exists.

Therefore, God does not exist

 

By 'God' I mean a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, and supremely good. Most theists accept that God will allow an evil if there is an God-justifying reason for him to do so - e.g. if that evil is required by God to secure some compensating good or to prevent some equally bad or worse evil. A 'gratuitous evil', by contrast, is an evil there is no God-justifying reason to permit.

 

By a ' God-justifying reason' I mean a reason that would actually justify God in permitting that evil. Suppose I can save a child drowning in a river by reaching out to him from the bank with a piece of splintered wood. I decide against doing so because I might get a splinter from the wood. The risk of getting a splinter gives me some reason not to save the child using that piece of wood, but of course it's hardly an adequate reason. If God exists, then presumably he has not just some reason to permit the evils we observe, but adequate reason - reason that justifies him in permitting those evils.

 

Further, for an evil to be gratuitous, there needs to be no all-things-considered good reason for God allow it. An all-things-considered good reason is a reason that, when all factors are taken into account, justifies the relevant course of action (or inaction). Suppose I see child A is about to walk into some nettles. I have good reason to prevent her doing so: she'll get badly stung. That 's a reason that would justify me in stopping her. Still, all-things-considered it might be better if I didn't stop child A and instead stopped child B whom I can see is about to walk in front of a car (assuming I can't do both). God may similarly allow evils he has reasons to prevent, including evils he'd be justified in preventing. What God presumably won't allow is evils he is all-things-considered justified in preventing. Henceforth, when I discuss 'God-justifying reasons' for doing x, I'll mean reasons that all-things-considered justify God in doing x.

 

Why suppose the second premise of the above argument is true? A so-called ‘noseeum’ inference has been offered in its support.[1] It is suggested that if we cannot think of any God-justifying reason for an evil we observe, then we are justified in concluding that no such reason exists.

 

One obvious way to challenge this evidential argument from evil is to try actually to identify reasons why God might be justified in allowing the evils we observe, thereby showing that the evils are not, after all, gratuitous. Various attempts have been made. Some suggest that much of the evil we observe (in particular, the moral evils - the morally bad things we do of our own volition) can be explained as a result of God giving us free will. Some suggest that many natural evils - such as the natural diseases and disasters which cause great suffering to the sentient inhabitants of this planet - can be explained as a result of the operation of natural laws that are required for compensating or still greater goods (e.g. perhaps the tectonic plate movements that cause earthquakes and thus much suffering are necessary for life to emerge in the first place, say). Some suggest that many evils are divinely justified because they are for character-building or 'soul making' purposes. Just as a parent will permit their child repeatedly to fall off their bike and graze their knees given it's only by enduring such repeated falls that the child can gain not only the good of being able to ride their bike but also the justified sense of achievement that comes with it, so God will permit us to graze our metaphorical knees given that it's only by such means that we can become better people.

 

However, even many theists accept that these various explanations of why God would allow such evils are not only individually, but collectively, inadequate. I'd suggest that, for the two hundred thousand year history of human beings, the death of on average around half of every generation of children (usually in a pretty horrific way), with all the child and parental suffering and grief that that involves, is on the face of it, very difficult for theists to explain in any of the above ways, as is the hundreds of millions of years of horrific non-human suffering that occurred before we humans showed up.

 

The skeptical theist takes a rather different approach to the evidential argument from evil. Rather than try to identify the reasons why God is justified in allowing observed evils, the skeptical theist suggests that our inability to identify such reasons is not a sound basis for concluding that no such reasons exist.

 

The skeptical theist challenges the noseeum inference offered in support of premise 2. True, we are sometimes justified in inferring that there are no Fs given that there do not appear to be any Fs. I am justified in believing there are no elephants in my garage given there do not, looking in from the street, appear to be any there. But, the skeptical theist, points out, noseeum inferences aren’t always sound. I am not justified in supposing there are no insects in my garage just because there do not, looking in from the street, appear to be any. Given my perceptual limitations, there could, for all I know, still be insects present. But then, suggests the skeptical theist, given our cognitive limitations, there could, for all we know, be God-justifying reasons for the evils we observe despite our inability to think of any.

 

We might think of those goods of which we are aware and those evils of which we are aware (and the entailment relations between them of which we are aware) as the tip of an iceberg of reasons. According to the skeptical theist, we don’t know how much of this iceberg is accessible to us or how representative the tip is. But then, given our cognitive limitations, we cannot conclude from the fact that the part of the iceberg to which we have cognitive access contains no God-justifying reason to allow the evils we observe that it is probable (or even more probable then not) that there is no such reason in what remains. We are, insists the skeptical theist, simply in the dark about whether such a reason exists.

 

So, the skeptical theist maintains that, even if we can't identify any God-justifying reasons for the evils we observe, we are not justified in concluding that gratuitous evils exist. But then the evidential argument fails. Let’s call the above skeptical theist attempt to block the noseeum inference the ‘anti-noseeum argument’.[2]

 

Note that skeptical theism involves to claims: (i) theism, and (ii) skepticism regarding our ability to think of the reasons that might God justify God in allowing observed evils. Also note than even an atheist might embrace the skeptical part of skeptical theism. While failing to believe in God, they may nevertheless accept that, for all they know, there is a reason that would justify God, if he existed, in allowing the evils we observe.

 

Skeptical theism has been embraced and developed by several philosophers of religion, including Alvin Plantinga who, in response to the evidential problem of evil, says:

 

…from the theistic perspective there is little or no reason to think that God would have a reason for a particular evil state of affairs only if we had a pretty good idea of what that reason might be. On the theistic conception, our cognitive powers, as opposed to God’s, are a bit slim for that. God might have reasons we cannot so much as understand.[3]

 

Michael Bergmann, a leading defender of skeptical theism, puts the objection thus:

 

The fact that humans can’t think of any God-justifying reason for permitting and evil, doesn’t make it likely that there are no such reasons; this is because if God existed, God’s mind would be far greater than our minds so it wouldn’t be surprising if God has reasons we weren’t able to think of.[4]

 

According to Bergmann, the skeptical theist’s skepticism (detached from their theism) includes as a main ingredient endorsement of such skeptical theses as:

 

ST1: We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we know of are representative of the possible goods there are.

 

ST2: We have no good reason for thinking the possible evils we know of are representative of the possible evils there are.

 

ST3: We have no good reason for thinking that the entailment relations we know of between possible goods and the permission of possible evils are representative of the entailment relations there are between possible goods and the permission of possible evils.

 

ST4: We have no good reason for thinking that the total moral value or disvalue we perceive in certain complex states of affairs accurately reflects the total moral value or disvalue they really have.

 

Bergmann maintains that, given the truth of ST1-ST4, we are in the dark about whether there exist God-justifying reasons to permit the evils we observe. Thus the evidential argument from evil fails.

 

As McBrayer and Swenson[5], two defenders of skeptical theism, point out, the skeptical theist’s anti-noseeum argument applies, not just with respect to God-justifying reasons to allow or bring about evils, but with respect to God-justifying reasons to allow or bring about anything at all. If skeptical theism is true, we cannot, from the fact that we are unable to think of a God-justifying reason for God to bring about or allow so-and-so, justifiably conclude that no such reason exists.

 

Notice however that the skeptical theist need not - and arguably should not - be too skeptical regarding knowledge divine reasons.

 

Note, first of all, that skeptical theism allows theists can legitimately draw some conclusions about divine reasons given what they observe of the world. For example, they can legitimately infer from the fact that Bert's house burnt down last night, that God, if exists, had an adequate reason to permit that. Here is an inference from an observed evil to a conclusion concerning divine reasons that is permitted by the skeptical theist.

 

Further, note that skeptical theists can allow that we can also know at least some of God's reasons by means of some form of direct, divine revelation. Perhaps God can and indeed has directly revealed to some of us what his reasons are, and indeed what reasons he lacks. In which case, no inference - let alone a noseeum inference - at all is required in order for us to possess knowledge of both the existence and the absence of God-justifying reasons.

 

So skeptical theists can, and usually do, allow human knowledge of divine reasons. They're merely skeptical about our ability to think of the reasons God might have for creating or allowing the evils - and indeed the various other things - we observe. They question only the 'noseeum' inference from (i) we can't think of any such reasons, to (ii) no such reasons exist.

 

Note that skeptical theists disagree over whether the evils we observe provide some evidence against theism. Some insist the evils we observe provide no evidence at all against theism. Others allow that observed evils may provide some evidence against theism. They merely insist that - given the shaky nature of any noseeum inference from observed evils to the conclusion that no God-justifying reason for those evils exists - what evidence there is falls short of allowing us justifiably to conclude that the world contains gratuitous evil and that consequently theism is false.

 

2. Skeptical theism and knowledge of God’s goodness

 

As McBrayer and Swenson acknowledge[6], skeptical theism also appears to threaten a number of arguments for the existence of the God of traditional monotheism. How are we to know that, not only is there an omnipotent and omniscient creator of the universe (a lower case ‘g’ god, if you like) but this creator is good (the upper case ‘G’ God)? According to McBrayer and Swenson, not by observing the universe and drawing conclusions about divine goodness on that basis. For if skeptical theism is true, we are as much in the dark about whether a good God would, or would not, bring about the goods we observe as we are about whether he would, or would not, bring about the evils we observe. But then observed goods are no more evidence for a good God then observed evils are evidence against.

 

Michael Bergmann, another proponent of skeptical theism, concurs that arguments for divine goodness based on identifying some feature of the universe as an all-considered good are undermined by skeptical theism. According to Bergmann, anyone who supposes the order we see in the natural world or the joy we witness in people’s lives give us reason to think that there is a benevolent God who is the cause of such things is failing to take into account the lessons of skeptical theism.[7]

 

This isn't to say that skeptical theism has the consequence that we should be skeptical about the existence of a good God. As Bergmann points out: ‘We needn’t conclude … that the skeptical theist’s skepticism is inconsistent with every way of arguing for the existence of a good God’[8]. Alternative ways by which we might come justifiably to believe in the existence of God might perhaps involve other forms of inference invulnerable to skeptical theism (e.g. an ontological or moral argument), or divine revelation.

 

3. The Pandora's Box Problem

 

One leading response to skeptical theism is to show that it opens up a skeptical Pandora's Box: it entails forms of skepticism that even the theists finds implausible and unacceptable. In particular, skeptical theism appears to require we also embrace skepticism about the external world and the past.

 

Consider the following familiar example of an undercutting defeater. I am watching, through a window, a series of widgets pass by on an assembly line. The widgets clearly look red. I come to believe the widgets are red on that basis. Presumably, given the widgets appear perceptually red to me, then it is ceteris paribus, reasonable for me to believe the widgets are red. However, suppose I am then told, by someone who has previously proved to be a reliable source of information, that the widgets are lit by a special defect-revealing light, a light that makes even non-red things look red. Is it still reasonable for me to believe the widgets are red?

 

Intuitively not. Why not? Because I now have good reason to think that the method by which I acquired the original belief is, in the circumstances in which I formed it, not to be trusted.

 

What, exactly, is 'defeated' in such cases? That's arguable. Some maintain that knowledge is lost in such cases. Even if the widgets are red (and I've been misled about that defect-revealing light), I don't know they are red. Others are inclined to think that knowledge need not be lost in such cases, but that at the very least reasonable belief is lost. Lasonen Aarnio[9], for example, argues that in such cases knowledge may be retained (e.g. if knowledge belief is acquired by means of a safe method, and the method employed - visual perception in this case - is indeed safe) but that reasonable belief is lost. According to Lasonen Aarnio, the reason reasonable belief is lost is that someone who continues to maintain their belief that the widgets are red even after having received the new information about the defect-revealing light, has embarked upon a belief-forming strategy that is not knowledge-conducive. Lasonen Aarnio suggests reasonableness

is at least largely a matter of managing one’s beliefs through the adoption of policies that are generally knowledge conducive, thereby manifesting dispositions to know and avoid false belief across a wide range of normal cases. Subjects who stubbornly stick to their beliefs in the face of new evidence manifest dispositions that are bad given the goal of knowledge or even of true belief.[10]

Someone who continues to believe even after acquiring such new evidence about the unreliability of the method by which they formed their belief will likely end up believing many falsehoods. I shall assume that Lasonen Aarnio is correct: whether or not knowledge is necessarily 'defeated' in such cases, reasonable belief is. Call such defeaters rationality defeaters (leaving it open whether knowledge is also lost).

 

But then doesn't skeptical theism generate a rationality defeater for beliefs regarding the external world and past? Given that it appears to me both that I ate toast for breakfast this morning and that there is an orange on the table in front of me, it is presumably reasonable for me to believe I ate toast for breakfast and that there is an orange before me. But if I now learn that, (i) God exists, and (ii) for all I know, there is a God-justifying reason for God to deceive me about these things, then, runs the objection, I can no longer reasonably believe I had toast for breakfast or that there is an orange there. For skeptical theism blocks any attempt to justify the belief that there are unlikely to be such God-justifying reasons by means of a noseeum inference: ‘I can’t think of a good reason why God would deceive me in that way, therefore there probably is no such reason.’ But then skeptical theism would seem to have the consequence that, for all I know, God does indeed have a good reason to deceive me in this way and is deceiving me for that reason. Just as learning about that defect-revealing light provides me with an rationality defeater for my belief that the widgets are red - I should be skeptical about whether or not the widgets are red - so learning that (i) and (ii) generates a rationality defeater for my beliefs about the external world and past - I should be skeptical about the external world and past.

 

Of course, most theists reject the view that we should be skeptical about the external world and past. They believe we can reasonably hold beliefs about both. But if their skeptical theism requires that they embrace such a broad skeptical position, then it appears they must either embrace that broad skeptical position, or else abandon their skeptical theism, thereby resurrecting the evidential argument from evil.

 

Note that other beliefs also appear to be thrown into doubt by skeptical theism. Take a theist's belief that their religion - Christianity, let's say - is true. Skeptical theism appears to entail that, for all they know, there is a reason that justifies God, if he exists, in deceiving them about Christianity (maybe the truth of Christianity is something about which God wishes to trick us in order to achieve some, to us unknown, greater good). But then it seems skeptical theism provides our Christian with rationality defeater for their Christian beliefs. They should, it seems, be skeptical about Christianity, just as they should be skeptical about the external world and past.

 

Note that, even if disbelievers (those who believe there is no God) do accept the skeptical part of skeptical theism (they endorse the thought that they are in no position to know whether there's a reason that justifies God, if he exists, in deceiving them), they don't end up falling into the same skeptical swamp. For, on their view, there exists no such God, and thus no such deceiver.

 

Commonsensism

 

In response to the Pandora's Box Objection, some insist that, yes, we cannot by means of a noseeum inference, conclude God lacks a reason to deceive us about the external world and past - i.e. we cannot think of a reason why God would deceive us about the external world and past; therefore there probably is no such reason. However, while that way of establishing that God lacks a reason to so deceive us is blocked, other ways of knowing that he lacks such a reason may remain. Perhaps, given there are these other ways of knowing about the external world and the past (ways that don’t rely on any noseeum inference regarding God’s reasons), skeptical theism constitutes no threat to such knowledge.

 

For example, Michael Bergmann, in response to the Pandora's Box objection, appeals to what he calls commonsensism.

 

Commonsensism: the view that (a) it is clear that we know many of the most obvious things we take ourselves to know (this includes the truth of simple perceptual, memory, introspective, mathematical, logical, and moral beliefs) and that (b) we also know (if we consider the question) that we are not in some skeptical scenario in which we are radically deceived in these beliefs.[11]

 

Bergmann then considers Sally, a hypothetical agnostic who believes ST1-ST4 but who also signs up to commonsensism. According to Bergmann, given Sally's commonsensism, especially clause (b),

 

she knows, in addition to the fact that she has hands, that’s she’s not a brain in a vat being deceived into thinking she has hands. And similarly, she knows that if God exists, then God doesn't have an all-things-considered good reason for making it seems that she has hands when in fact she doesn’t. She knows this despite her endorsement of ST1-ST4… By endorsing ST1-ST4, Sally is committing herself to the view that we don't know, just by reflecting on possible goods, possible evils, the entailment relations between them, and their seeming value or disvalue, what God’s reasons might be. But it doesn't follow that we have no way at all of knowing anything about what reasons God might have for doing things… In general, for all the things we commonsensically know to be true, we know that God, (if God exists) didn't have an all-things-considered good reason to make them false.[12]

 

Note the intriguing move made here: from the fact that we do know (other than by means of a noseeum inference) about the external world and past, we can infer that God, if he exists, has no God-justifying reason to deceive us about the external world and past. A similar move is made by Beaudoin[13] who, in response the thought that skeptical theism entails that, for all we know, God actualised s: an old-looking universe that is in truth just five minutes old (this being the universe we inhabit), suggests that while we cannot infer God lacks a reason to so deceive us about the age of the universe from the fact that we cannot think of any such reason, insists that nevertheless we can infer God lacks such a reason from the fact that we do, in fact, know the universe is older than that. Beaudoin draws the following analogy:

 

Suppose I know nothing about Smith’s honesty, or lack thereof. For all I know, Smith is an inveterate liar. Now I claim to believe something (P) Smith told me, but not on the basis of Smith’s telling me; instead I’ve confirmed with my own eyes that (P). Clearly in this case it wouldn’t do for someone to challenge the rationality of my belief by pointing out that for all I know Smith is a liar; my belief that (P) isn’t based on Smith’s testimony.[14]

 

Similarly, then, says Beaudoin, we may yet know the universe is old, not by way of a noseeum inference to a conclusion about God's lacking reason to deceive us concerning its age, but in some other way. Perhaps, says Beaudoin,

 

 there is some theologically neutral, telling philosophical argument for rejecting skepticism about the past. If there is, then on this basis the skeptical theist can conclude that God has no [morally sufficient reason] for actualizing s, since he has not actualized it.[15]

 

I call this the Bergmann/Beaudoin response to the Pandora's Box objection to skeptical theism.

 

I don't believe the Bergmann/Beaudoin response succeeds in disarming The Pandora's Box objection. Consider another putative example of rationality defeat, which I call Olly's Orange[16].

 

Olly's Orange

 

Suppose I seem very clearly to see an orange on the table in front of me. Other things being equal, it seems reasonable for me to believe that there is an orange there. Suppose I do consequently form the belief that there's an orange there. However, I now come by new information. I am given excellent reason to believe (i) that someone called Olly is present who is in possession of an amazing holographic projector capable of projecting onto the table before me an entirely convincing-looking image of an orange, and (ii) that I am entirely in the dark about whether Olly is now projecting such an image. Given this new information, is it reasonable for me to continue to believe there's an orange before me?

 

I think the answer is pretty clearly no: it's not reasonable for me to continue to hold my belief about the orange. I should, given this new information, withhold belief - be skeptical - about whether there's an orange there.

 

Now in response to my skepticism, suppose someone argues like so. It is generally reasonable for us to trust our senses and memories. As Bergmann notes, 'it is clear we know many of the most obvious things we take ourselves to know (this includes the truth of simple perceptual [and] memory...beliefs).' In particular, such skeptic-busting principles as the following are plausible:

 

P1. If it clearly perceptually looks to me as if S is the case, then, ceteris paribus, it is reasonable for me to believe that S is the case.

 

P2. If someone tells me that S is the case, then, ceteris paribus, it is reasonable for me to believe S is the case.

 

(The ceteris paribus clauses here will obviously include where you also have good reason to distrust your senses or the testifier. E.g. it's not reasonable to believe a stick is bent given it looks bent when half immersed in this glass of water if I have good reason to suppose that even straight sticks look bent under those circumstances.) But then, given it clearly looks to me as if there is an orange on the table before me, it is reasonable to believe there is an orange there. This is something I can 'commonsensically' take myself to know. And, given I can reasonably believe that there is an orange there, so I can reasonably believe I am not being deceived by Olly etc. about there being an orange there. So I am not in the dark about whether Olly is using his projector. I can reasonably believe (and indeed know) that he is not.

 

I think it is pretty clear that something has gone wrong with this Bergmann-Beaudion-style boot-strapping justification for supposing I can reasonably believe there is an orange there and thus reasonably believe Olly is not deceiving me.

 

Note, in particular, that even if principles such as P1 and P2 are correct, the ceteris paribus clause surely kicks in when I am presented with new evidence that my senses (or the testifier) are not to be trusted in the circumstances in which I formed the belief. Ceteris paribus, I can reasonably there's an orange there if that's how it looks. But not given I have good grounds to accept, and do accept, the new information that (i) Olly is present and easily capable of deceiving me, and (ii) for all I know Olly is in fact deceiving me. Under these circumstances, it seems I possess a rationality defeater for my perceptually-based belief. I reasonably consider myself 'commonsensically' to know there's an orange present.

 

But then similarly, irrespective of whether it is, ceteris paribus, reasonable for us to believe that things are perceptually as they appear to be, given I have good grounds to accept, and do accept, that (i) there is a being easily capable of deceiving me perceptually, and (ii) for all I know this being is deceiving me, then I have a rationality for my perceptually based beliefs.

 

Hence the Bergmann/Beaudoin response to the Pandora's Box objection appears to fail.

 

Can we know God is no deceiver?

 

Another response to the Pandora's Box objection is to argue that we can, independently, know God is no deceiver because we can know that God is good and a good God is no deceiver. In his Third Meditation, Descartes offers an argument for this claim. He says God ‘cannot be a deceiver, since it is a dictate of the natural light that all fraud and deception spring from some defect’, and God is without defect. However, Maitzen[17] (2009) points out that while fraud and deception flow from some defective situation (a terrorist about to explode a bomb who can only be thwarted by deception, for example) it does not follow that ‘fraud and deception are defective responses to that situation’.[18]Hobbes similalrly points out, in response to Descartes, that it

 

… is the common belief that no fault is committed by medical men who deceive sick people for health’s sake, nor by parents who mislead their children for their good … M. Descartes must therefore look to the this proposition, God can in no case deceive us, taken universally, and see whether it is true…[19]

 

Where a reason sufficient to justify us in engaging in deceive exists, our engaging in such deception does not require there be any defect in us. So why does God’s similarly engaging in such deception require there be some defect in him? The New Testament also contains passages suggesting God engages in deliberate deception. St. Paul describes God as sending some people ‘a powerful delusion, leading them to believe what is false.’ (2^nd Thessalonians 2:11). So the Cartesian thought that God is no deceiver is Biblically challenged, too.

 

Is being 'in the dark' about whether God has reason to deceive us sufficient to justify skepticism?

 

Here's another response to the Pandora's Box problem.

 

Suppose Paul tells me, with confidence, that he had an apple for breakfast. I have only just met Paul and don't know anything about him. Nevertheless, I believe him. Is it reasonable for me to believe him?

 

Well, am I not in the dark about whether Paul has reason to deceive me about his breakfast this morning? Paul is a complete stranger to me. I know nothing about his background or his motives. So, for all I know, Paul has some all-things-considered good reason to deceive me about his breakfast. Should I not then withhold judgement about - be skeptical - about whether Paul had an apple for breakfast?

 

Skepticsm in this case seems absurd. Surely, despite the fact that I am in the dark about Paul's motives and the reasons he might have to deceive me, it's reasonable for me to just take Paul's word for it about his having an apple for breakfast.

 

Note that principle P2 explains why it's reasonable for me to take Paul's word for it about the apple: ceteris paribus it is reasonable for me to take testimony at face value; hence it's reasonable in this case. Notice that if I were sceptical in this case, then consistency would require I be sceptical about a great deal since much of what I believe is based on the testimony of folk not well known to me - folk who, for all I know, have reason to deceive me.

 

Hence, a defender of skeptical theism may insist, the mere fact that I am in the dark about whether God has good reason to deceive me - the fact that for all I know he has reason to deceive me - does not entail that I cannot reasonable believe God's testimony, or indeed my senses and memory.

 

To assess this response to the Pandora's Box Objection, we need to get clearer about what being 'in the dark' and 'for all I know' mean here. When sceptical theists say we are 'in the dark' about whether there exist God-justifying reasons for God to allow the evils we observe - that 'for all we know' such reasons exist - they re-articulate this thought in a variety of ways. Some speak of probability. They say that the probability of God having such a reason is inscrutable to us, by which they mean that we cannot reasonably assign any probability to God's having such a reason: neither high, nor low, nor middling. Others speak of probability but say only that we cannot assign a low probability to God's having such a reason.

 

If we now turn to the case of Paul, I think it is pretty clear that while I might, correctly, say 'for all I know' Paul has a reason to deceive me - that I am 'in the dark' about whether Paul has reason to deceive me - the sense in which these admissions of ignorance are true is not the sense with which these expressions are used by the sceptical theist.

 

It's actually very reasonable for me to believe that Paul lacks a reason to deceive me because, after all, Paul is a human being, and I know a great deal about human beings generally, including what motives them to deceive others, what reasons lead them to deceive others, the extent to which they can survey the range of reasons that would justify them in deceiving us, and so on. Given all this information about human beings and their reasons to deceive, it's reasonable for me to believe that, while Paul might have reason to deceive me, the probability he actually has such a reason is low. But then that low probability doesn't give me a rationality defeater for my belief that Paul had an apple for breakfast given only that he told me so. True, I am, in a sense, 'in the dark' about whether Paul has such a reason - 'for all I know' Paul has such a reason - but only in the very weak sense that it's possible that he has such a reason - I can't entirely rule out his possessing such a reason. I can still reasonably assign a low probability to his having such a reason.

 

When we turn to a skeptical theist's claim that we are 'in the dark' about whether there are God-justifying reasons for observed evils, on the other hand, the claim is that the probability God has such a reason is inscrutable and/or is at least not low. If we could reasonably suppose the probability of there being such a reason was low, then perhaps we might still reasonably believe there's no such reason, and thus reasonably believe that the evils we observe are gratuitous. So, if their response to the evidential problem of evil is to succeed, the skeptical theist's sense of our being 'in the dark' re the existence of certain God justifying reasons needs to be a very different sense to that which applies in the case of Paul's potential reasons to deceive me.

 

But then if it's in this stronger sense that we are supposedly 'in the dark' regarding the existence of God-justifying reasons of observed evils, then it will also be in this stronger sense that we are 'in the dark' regarding the existence of God-justifying reasons for deceiving us about the external world and past. But then the analogy drawn between our 'being in the dark' about God's having good reason to deceive us and my being 'in the dark' about Paul's having good reason to deceive me fails. Even if it is reasonable for me to trust Paul, notwithstanding my being 'in the dark' about his having good reason to deceive me, it does not follow that it's reasonable for me to trust God, notwithstanding my being 'in the dark' about God's having good reason to deceive me. Indeed, it seems I really do have reason to distrust God since I cannot - as I can in the case of Paul - reasonably assign a low probability to God's having good reason to deceive me.

 

Note, by the way, that in Olly's Orange, for my analogy to appropriate, I must be 'in the dark' in the strong sense about whether Olly has turned his projector on. That's to say, I cannot reasonably assign a low probability to Olly's having turned his projector on. Under those circumstances, it appears I do have a rationality defeater for my belief there's an orange before me.

 

Conclusion

 

Perhaps the Pandora's Box objection to skeptical theism can successfully be dealt with, but it seems clear to me that none of the above attempted solutions succeed. In which case, the sceptical theist does appear to be faced with a dilemma: (i) maintain their sceptical theism in order to deal with the evidential argument from evil, but then lose reasonable belief in the external world, the past, and Christianity (or Islam, or whatever), or (ii) abandon their skeptical theism, leaving them to again face the evidential problem from evil.

 

Stephen Law is Reader in Philosophy at Heythrop College, University of London.

 

---

[1] Wykstra dubbed such arguments ‘noseeum’ inferences. See his 'Rowe's noseeum arguments from evil' in D. Howard-Snyder, (ed.) The Evidential Argument from Evil (Indiana: Indiana University Free Press, 1996) 126-50.

 

[2] I note in passing that a version of the evidential argument from evil might still succeed even if the claim that gratuitous evil exists cannot be justified. Suppose that for a belief to be justified, it’s epistemic probability must be at least 0.85 (if one bullet is placed in six chamber revolver, the chamber is spun and the gun about to be fired, the probability it won’t fire is 0.85, but intuitively I am not justified in thinking the gun won’t fire). But then suppose the probability that gratuitous evil exists is 0.84. Then the probability that gratuitous evil exists is not sufficient for belief that it exists to be justified. Nevertheless, a probability of 0.84 is sufficient to lower theism’s probability below credibility. My thanks to Trent Dougherty for flagging this.

[3] A. Plantinga, 'Epistemic probability and evil', in D. Howard-Snyder (ed.) op cit. 1996, 69-96, 73.

[4] M. Bergmann, 'Commonsense skeptical theism' in K. Clark and M. Rea (eds.) Science, Religion, and Metaphysics: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 9-30, 11.

 

[5] McBrayer, J. and Swenson, P. 'Skepticism and the argument from divine hiddenness', Religious Studies 48 (2012), 129-150.

 

[6] McBrayer and Swenson (2012) op cit.

[7] M. Bergmann, 'Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil' in T. Flint and M. Rea (eds.) Oxford Handbook to Philosophical Theology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 374-399.

 

[8] Bergmann, (2009) op cit.

[9] M. Lasonen Aarnio, M. 'Unreasonable Knowledge', Philosophical Perspectives, 24 (2010) 1-21.

[10] Laasonen Aarnio (2010) op cit. 2.

 

[11] M. Bergmann (2012) op cit. 10.

 

[12] M. Bergmann (2012) op cit. 15.

[13] J. Beaudoin, J. 'Skepticism and the skeptical theist', Faith and Philosophy, 22 (2005) 42-56.

 

[14] Beaudoin 2005 op cit. 44.

[15] Beaudoin 2005, op cit. 45.

 

[16] I previously used this example in S. Law, 'The Pandora's Box Objection to Skeptical Theism' in International Journal of Religious Studies, 78 (2015) 285-299.

[17] S. Maitzen, S. 'Skeptical theism and moral obligation. International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion, 65 (2009) 93-103.

[18] S. Maitzen, op cit. 97.

[19] E. Haldane, E, and G.R.T. Ross (trans.), The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) 78.

THE PANDORA'S BOX OBJECTION TO SKEPTICAL THEISM

THE PANDORA'S BOX OBJECTION TO SKEPTICAL THEISM

 International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78 (3):285-299 (2015)

ABSTRACT: Skeptical theism is a leading response to the evidential argument from evil against the existence of God. Skeptical theists attempt to block the inference from the existence of inscrutable evils (evil for which we can think of no God-justifying reason) to gratuitous evils (evils for which there is no God justifying reason) by insisting that given our cognitive limitations, it wouldn't be surprising if there were God-justifying reasons we can't think of. A well-known objection to skeptical theism is that it opens up a skeptical Pandora’s box, generating implausibly wide-ranging forms of skepticism, including skepticism about the external world and past. This paper looks at several responses to this Pandora's box objection, including a popular response devised by Beaudoin and Bergmann. I find that all of the examined responses fail. It appears the Pandora's box objection to skeptical theism still stands.

 

1. The skeptical theist response to the evidential argument from evil

 

Skeptical theism is currently one of the most popular[1] theistic responses to the evidential argument from evil, a typical version of which is outlined below.

 

Let an inscrutable evil be an evil that (even after careful reflection) we can think of no God-justifying reason for God, if he exists, to permit. And let a gratuitous evil be an evil there's no God-justifying reason for God, if he exists, to permit. Then an evidential argument from evil runs:

 

(1) There are inscrutable evils.

(2) Therefore, probably there are gratuitous evils.

(3) God, if he existed, would not permit gratuitous evils.

(4) Therefore, probably God does not exist.

 

Skeptical theists challenge the inference from (1) to (2). They maintain our inability to think of a God-justifying reason for an evil does not allow us reasonably to conclude there probably is no such reason. Inferences of this form are often termed ‘noseeum’[2]. Noseeum inferences can be sound: the fact that I can’t see any elephants in my garage allows me reasonably to conclude there are probably no elephants there. However, I can’t reasonably conclude there are probably no insects in my garage given only the fact that I can’t spot any (looking in from the street). Given my perceptual limitations, there might still easily be insects present. The skeptical theist maintains that, given our cognitive limitations, the inference from (1) to (2) is similarly flawed. Michael Bergmann, a leading defender of skeptical theism, puts the objection thus:

 

The fact that humans can’t think of any God-justifying reason for permitting and evil, doesn’t make it likely that there are no such reasons; this is because if God existed, God’s mind would be far greater than our minds so it wouldn’t be surprising if God has reasons we weren’t able to think of. (2012: 11)

 

According to Bergmann, the skeptical theist’s skepticism (detached from their theism) includes as a main ingredient endorsement of such skeptical theses as:

 

ST1: We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we know of are representative of the possible goods there are.

 

ST2: We have no good reason for thinking the possible evils we know of are representative of the possible evils there are.

 

ST3: We have no good reason for thinking that the entailment relations we know of between possible goods and the permission of possible evils are representative of the entailment relations there are between possible goods and the permission of possible evils.

 

ST4: We have no good reason for thinking that the total moral value or disvalue we perceive in certain complex states of affairs accurately reflects the total moral value or disvalue they really have. (2012: 11-12)

 

Bergmann maintains that, given the truth of ST1-ST4, we are simply in the dark about whether there exist God-justifying reasons to permit the evils we observe. But then the evidential argument from evil fails.

 

2. The Pandora’s box objection to skeptical theism

 

Skeptical theism has been criticised on the grounds that it opens up a skeptical Pandora’s box, generating forms of skepticism that are implausibly wide-ranging and strong. In particular, it is argued that skeptical theism requires we also embrace skepticism about the external world and the past.[3] Why so? Well, how do we know God doesn’t have good reason to create a false impression of an external world, or good reason to create the false impression that the universe and myself are more than five minutes old? Skeptical theism blocks any attempt to justify the belief that there are unlikely to be such God-justifying reasons by means of a noseeum inference: ‘I can’t think of a good reason why God would deceive me in that way, therefore there probably is no such reason.’ But then skeptical theism would seem to have the consequence that, for all I know, God does indeed have a good reason to deceive me in this way and is deceiving me for that reason.

 

Wilks points out one of the more outlandish skeptical consequences he supposes skeptical theism generates. He imagines an ‘eccentric theist’ who claims God has created a sub-10,000 year old Earth orbited by the sun, with pink elephants. When compelling scientific evidence against these claims is pointed out to our eccentric theist, he replies: ‘We cannot fathom God’s reasons. For all we know, God has good reason to present us with misleading evidence against these claims, despite their truth. But then I have been supplied with no good reason to suppose my claims about a sun-orbited young earth with pink elephants are false.’ Wilks maintains that if skeptical theists are to be consistent, they should accept the reasonableness of this reply, and that if they do so, then

 

theism comes off looking less rational than it did before the defense… [O]ne might as well spare the effort of dispute and simply pronounce belief in God to be irrational. (2009: 76)

 

Call the suggestion that skeptical theism leads to such absurd skeptical consequences concerning the external world and past the Pandora’s box objection. My first aim in this paper is to spell out why one of the leading responses to this objection – a response made by, among others, Beaudoin and Bergmann – fails.

 

3. Bergmann and Beaudoin’s response to the Pandora’s box objection

 

In response to the Pandora’s box objection, Bergmann appeals to what he calls commonsensism:

 

Commonsensism: the view that (a) it is clear that we know many of the most obvious things we take ourselves to know (this includes the truth of simple perceptual, memory, introspective, mathematical, logical, and moral beliefs) and that (b) we also know (if we consider the question) that we are not in some skeptical scenario in which we are radically deceived in these beliefs. (2012: 10)

 

Having defined commonsensism, Bergmann asks us to consider Sally, a hypothetical agnostic who endorses skeptical theses ST1-ST4 but who, given her commonsensism, can still know many things via perception and memory:

 

Take for example her knowledge that she has two hands. Given Sally’s commonsensism – in particular, clause (b) – she knows, in addition to the fact that she has hands, that’s she’s not a brain in a vat being deceived into thinking she has hands. And similarly, she knows that if God exists, then God doesn't have an all-things-considered good reason for making it seems that she has hands when in fact she doesn’t. She knows this despite her endorsement of ST1-ST4… By endorsing ST1-ST4, Sally is committing herself to the view that we don't know, just by reflecting on possible goods, possible evils, the entailment relations between them, and their seeming value or disvalue, what God’s reasons might be. But it doesn't follow that we have no way at all of knowing anything about what reasons God might have for doing things… In general, for all the things we commonsensically know to be true, we know that God, (if God exists) didn't have an all-things-considered good reason to make them false (2012: 15)

 

Beaudoin suggests a similar move in response to the objection that skeptical theism entails skepticism about s, where s is the state of affairs in which God created an old-looking universe just five minutes ago. This objection, counters Beaudoin,

 

presupposes that the basis on which any skeptical theist believes God does not actualize s is an… inference from ‘I can’t see what would justify God’s actualizing s’ to ‘probably there is no reason - probably God does not actualize s.’ This basis for believing that s does not obtain is unavailable to the skeptical theist… But the point is other… reasons… might still be available to the skeptical theist… Consider an analogy. Suppose I know nothing about Smith’s honesty, or lack thereof. For all I know, Smith is an inveterate liar. Now I claim to believe something (P) Smith told me, but not on the basis of Smith’s telling me; instead I’ve confirmed with my own eyes that (P). Clearly in this case it wouldn’t do for someone to challenge the rationality of my belief by pointing out that for all I know Smith is a liar; my belief that (P) isn’t based on Smith’s testimony… Perhaps there is some theologically neutral, telling philosophical argument for rejecting skepticism about the past. If there is, then on this basis the skeptical theist can conclude that God has no [morally sufficient reason] for actualizing s, since he has not actualized it. (2005: 44-45)

 

According to Bergmann and Beaudoin, then, given there are other ways of knowing about the external world and the past (ways that don’t rely on any noseeum inference regarding God’s reasons), skeptical theism constitutes no threat to such knowledge. But then, granted the fact that the skeptical theist does indeed possess knowledge of the external world and past, they can conclude that God has not, for some unknown reason, radically deceived them about such things.

 

Call this the Bergmann/Beaudoin response to the Pandora’s box objection. As I explain below, the Bergmann/Beaudoin response fails.

 

4. Why the Bergmann/Beaudoin response fails

 

In the terminology of epistemic defeat, the reason why skeptical theism might appear to require we embrace skepticism concerning the external world and past is that it appears to generate an undercutting defeater for all our beliefs grounded in perceptual experience and memory. A stock illustration of an undercutting defeater involves widgets on an assembly line. Given the widgets appear perceptually to me be red, I am prima facie justified in believing that they are red. However, if I'm subsequently informed by a reliable person that the widgets are illuminated by a red light (to reveal imperfections) that makes them appear red even if they are not, then, it’s suggested, I come to possess an undercutting defeater for my original belief. Why so? Well I now possess good grounds for thinking that the method by which I acquired by original belief, is, in the circumstances in which I formed it, unreliable and not to be trusted.

 

But what, exactly, is defeated in such cases? Typically, it's supposed that justification, and thus knowledge, are defeated. On acquiring that new evidence about the red light, I can no longer be said either to justifiably believe or to know that the widgets are red.

 

Now, it is controversial whether, in such a case, justification and knowledge really are lost. Lasonen Aarnio (2010) suggests that the intuition that knowledge is lost in such cases is often misleading. The implications of Lasonen Aarnio’s view for the Pandora’s box objection will be discussed towards the end of this paper. For argument's sake, I shall accept for the time being that the widespread intuition that justification and knowledge are lost in such cases is indeed correct.

 

Why suppose skeptical theism generates a defeater for beliefs about the external world and past? Well, given that it appears to me both that I ate toast for breakfast this morning and that there is an orange on the table in front of me, perhaps I am prima facie justified in believing I ate toast for breakfast and that there is an orange before me. But if I now learn that, (i) God exists, and (ii) for all I know, God has an all-things-considered good reason to deceive me about these things, then, runs the objection, I can no longer justifiably believe I had toast for breakfast or that there is an orange there. At the heart of the Pandora’s box objection lies the thought that, just as learning about that red light generates an undercutting defeater for the belief that the widgets are red, so learning that (i) and (ii) generates an undercutting defeater for beliefs about the external world and past.

 

Consider what appears to be an analogous case.

 

Olly’s orange. Suppose I see what appears to be an orange on the table in front of me. Let’s assume I'm thereby prima facie justified, and indeed can be considered commonsensically to know, that there’s an orange there. But suppose I then discover the following. Someone – call him Olly – possesses a holographic projector capable of producing entirely convincing-looking visual appearances onto the table in front of me. Now suppose the probability that Olly is using his projector is inscrutable to me. Suppose, for example, that I learn Olly has an urn of balls. Prior to my observing the table, Olly selected a ball at random from this urn. If the ball was black, Olly projected an entirely convincing-looking holographic image of an orange onto the table. If Olly selected a non-black ball, he placed a real orange on the table. I have no clue concerning what proportion of balls in Olly’s urn are black. For all I know, all the balls are black, none are black, 50% are black, etc. I can’t reasonably assign any probability to any of these hypotheses. Thus I remain in the dark about whether Olly placed a real orange, rather than a holographic image of an orange, on the table.

 

On being informed by a generally reliable source of this backstory to my experience, do I remain justified in believing there is an orange on the table before me? Can I be said to know there’s an orange there? Intuitively not[4]. Even if there’s a real orange before me, it appears I’m no longer justified in believing this. For all I know, I'm observing a holographic image. The backstory appears to provide me with an undercutting defeater for my belief that there is a real orange on the table, notwithstanding the fact that I might otherwise have been justified in believing, and indeed might otherwise have been considered commonsensically to know, that there’s an orange present.

 

But suppose I now attempt to defend in the following manner (Beaudoin-and-Bergmann-style) my belief that there’s an orange before me. Of course I don’t believe there’s an orange there because I suppose it’s unlikely Olly picked a black ball from his urn. Rather, I have some other way of knowing there’s an orange there: in this case direct perceptual experience. Given there clearly appears to be an orange present, I can commonsensically consider myself to know there is an orange present. And, granted I do know there is an orange present, but can know this only if Olly didn’t pick a black ball, I can conclude Olly didn’t pick a black ball.

 

Clearly, the above argument fails. It overlooks the fact that the backstory about Olly and his urn appears to provide me with a defeater for my belief that there is an orange before me despite the fact that my belief is grounded in direct perceptual experience. Beliefs that are prima facie justified and that may be commonsensically considered known given such an experience can in principle be defeated, and such a defeater is what the backstory about Olly and the urn appears to generate.

 

At the heart of the Pandora’s box objection lies the thought that skeptical theism provides us with an analogous backstory to our everyday perceptual experiences. Ordinarily, perhaps I'm prima facie justified in believing, and indeed can be commonsensically considered to know, that there is an orange before me given that is how things visually appear. But if I learn there is a God who has complete control over my perceptual experiences, and that, for all I know, this God has good reason both to generate a false impression of an orange and indeed deceive me about the external world more generally, then this discovery appears analogously to supply me with an undercutting defeater for my belief that there is an orange on the table. If I can no longer be said to know there’s an orange on the table given my discovery of the backstory about Olly and the urn, how can I be said to know there’s an orange on the table given my discovery of the truth of skeptical theism?

 

Bergmann and Beaudoin suppose that to argue that skeptical theism provides grounds for withholding judgement about the external world and the past is akin to arguing that the fact that I am in the dark about whether Smith is an inveterate liar gives me grounds for suspending judgement about the truth of Smith’s assertion that (P). Beaudoin reminds us, correctly, that I might have independent grounds for believing (P), and thus grounds for supposing Smith isn’t lying about (P). Bergmann and Beaudoin suggest that, in the same way, I may have some independent way of knowing about the external world and the past (i.e. some way independent of inferring that God has no reason to deceive me given only that I cannot think of such a reason). They then insist that, granted the fact that I do have knowledge about the external world and past by this other route, I can conclude that God has not, for some unknown reason, radically deceived me about such things.

 

As should now be clear, the analogy Beaudoin tries to draw with the Smith case fails. What skeptical theism appears to generate is not just a defeater for beliefs about the external world and past based on a noseeum inference about God’s reasons, but a defeater for beliefs about the external world and past grounded in other potential methods of knowing too, including perceptual experience and memory. But then pointing out that skeptical theists don’t attempt to justify their beliefs in the external world and the past by means of such a noseeum fails to engage with the objection raised.

 

Notice that for atheists who embrace the skeptical part of skeptical theism, no such defeater need be generated. The atheist who accepts ST1-4 is in a position analogous to someone who justifiably believes that while there is indeed an urn containing some unknown percentage of black balls, there’s no such person as Olly who generates a deceptive perceptual appearance of an orange if the ball he draws at random from that urn is black. Such an individual does not, on learning about the urn and its mysterious contents, come to possess an undercutting defeater for their belief that there is an orange before them given only that is how things visually appear.

 

So, while the Pandora’s Box objection to skeptical theism might yet be successfully dealt with, the Bergmann/Beaudoin response fails.

 

5. Relevant disanalogies?

 

The skeptical theist may insist there's some relevant difference between my situation in Olly’s orange and that in which skeptical theists find themselves: a difference that explains why my coming to believe the backstory in Olly’s orange generates a defeater for my belief that there’s an orange before me, whereas coming to believe the truth of skeptical theism does not. Perhaps there is such a difference: I won’t attempt to deal here with every suggestion here that might be made, but I will look at two more obvious suggestions and explain why both fail.

 

First, consider the suggestion that it is the role of a certain sort of probabilistic mechanism - pulling balls from an urn at random in to determine whether or not to project a deceptive image - that leads us to suppose a defeater is generated in Olly’s orange. But then, as no such probabilistic mechanism is employed by God in determining whether or not to give us deceptive experiences, the skeptical theist is not in a relevantly similar situation.

 

However, in Olly’s orange, the urn/ball component of the backstory would seem to be inessential so far as the intuition of defeat is concerned. What generates the intuition of defeat is the fact that I’m in the dark about the probability of it being a real orange rather than a deceptive image that Olly placed on the table. The urn/ball component is included in the backstory to explain why I'm in the dark about that probability, but that component is optional. No explanation of why I'm in the dark about probability need be included. Alternatively, my being in the dark about that probability might be explained by my being in the dark about the probability that Olly has an all-things-considered good reason to place a deceptive image rather than a real orange on the table (this would obviously make Olly’s orange still more closely analogous to the skeptical theist’s position). Either way, the story generates the same intuition of defeat.

 

A second suggestion regarding a relevant disanalogy between Olly’s orange and the skeptical theist’s situation is that the skeptical theist may have good reason to suppose that God, if he exists, is morally perfect, and that a morally perfect God will not deceive us even if he has an all-things-considered good reason to do so. Thus the probability that we are being deceived by God, if he exists, is not, as it is in Olly's case, inscrutable, but low.

 

But why suppose a morally perfect God won’t deceive us? Descartes offers an argument for that claim in his Third Meditation, where he says God ‘cannot be a deceiver, since it is a dictate of the natural light that all fraud and deception spring from some defect’, and God is without defect. But as Maitzen (2009) points out, while all fraud and deception flow from some defective situation (a terrorist about to explode a bomb who can only be thwarted by deception, for example) it does not follow that ‘fraud and deception are defective responses to that situation’ (2009, 97). Maitzen here follows Hobbes who, in response to Descartes, points out that it

 

… is the common belief that no fault is committed by medical men who deceive sick people for health’s sake, nor by parents who mislead their children for their good … M. Descartes must therefore look to the this proposition, God can in no case deceive us, taken universally, and see whether it is true… (Haldane and Ross 1967: 78)

 

Where an all-things-considered good reason to deceive exists, our engaging in such deception does not require there be any defect in us. So why would God’s engaging in such deception require there be some defect in him?

 

Furthermore, those who consider the New Testament a reliable source of information about God should note that it contains passages suggesting God does indeed engage in deliberate deception. For example, St. Paul describes God as sending some people ‘a powerful delusion, leading them to believe what is false.’ (2^nd Thessalonians 2:11). So the thought that God is no deceiver appears Biblically challenged, too.

 

To conclude this section: there may be some relevant disanalogy between the skeptical theist’s position and mine in Olly’s orange which explains why, though my belief is defeated in Olly’s orange, the skeptical theist’s beliefs about the external world are not. However, neither of above suggestions appear to succeed in identifying such a disanalogy.

 

6. Externalism and defeat

 

Finally, I want briefly to anticipate some other responses to the Pandora’s box objection – responses grounded in externalist thinking about knowledge and defeat.

 

Skeptical theism is usually associated with externalist epistemologies on which whether or not a subject is justified and/or warranted in believing that p is determined by factors that may lie beyond the awareness of that subject - factors such as whether the belief was formed in a reliable way and/or via properly functioning faculties. Externalists typically allow that a subject’s beliefs may be justified/warranted even if they lack information about whether such conditions are satisfied. Externalists may be right about that.

 

However, from the supposed fact that you do not need information about the reliability of your faculties in order to have knowledge or justified belief about the world, it does not follow that the acquisition of such information cannot affect what you know or are justified in believing about the world. Indeed, many externalists, Bergmann included, allow that if a subject comes to possess information that their belief was formed in an unreliable way, then their belief may be defeated (Bergmann 1997: 405-6).

 

Bergmann distinguishes three doxastic attitudes towards a proposition p: believing p; disbelieving p (believing p is false); and withholding p (refraining from either believing or disbelieving p). (He also allows one can also take no doxastic attitude at all towards a proposition (2005: 422).) Bergmann proposes that, where p*_S is the proposition that S’s belief that p is formed in a reliable way, then disbelieving or even just withholding on p*_S supplies S with a defeater for the belief that p (2005: 426).

 

Bergmann uses the following modified widget example to illustrate how withholding on p*_S generates a defeater for p. Suppose Sally comes to form the belief that the widgets are red based on how the widgets look to her as they pass by on the conveyer belt. And suppose Sally has no idea whether there is a red light shining on the widgets or even how likely it is that there would be such a light shining on them. Bergmann continues:

 

Sally now considers the higher-level proposition that her belief The widgets are red is formed in a reliable way. Being completely uncertain about whether that higher-level proposition is true, she resists believing both it and its denial. In other words, if p is the proposition The widgets are red, she withholds p*_Sally. Does this give her, in these circumstances, a defeater for her belief that the widgets are red? I think it does. (2005: 426)

 

So, on Bergmann’s view, a belief is defeated if one either disbelieves, or even just withholds judgement on whether, the belief was formed in a reliable way.

 

The above principle would explain why, in Olly’s Orange, my belief that there is an orange on the table before me is defeated. On realizing I’m in the dark about whether Olly picked a black ball from his urn (and so generated a deceptive impression of an orange) I disbelieve, or at least withhold on whether, my belief was formed in a reliable way. Thus my belief is defeated.

 

So now consider Sarah, a skeptical theist, who, as a result of her perceptual experience, believes there’s an orange on the table before her. On Bergmann’s view, Sarah’s belief about the orange is defeated if, as a result of her skeptical theism, she comes to disbelieve, or even just withhold judgement on whether, her belief was formed in a reliable way. Now I take it that at the heart of the Pandora’s box objection lies something like the following thought. Given her skeptical theism, Sarah really should suppose she is in the dark about whether God has an all-things-considered good reason to deceive her about the orange. But then she should disbelieve, or at least withhold, on whether her belief about the orange was formed in a reliable way. So she should consider her belief defeated.

 

Now, in response, an externalist like Bergmann may point out, correctly, that he is committed only to S’s belief that p being defeated if S does in fact disbelieve or withhold on p*_S. Bergmann may insist that, so long as Sarah doesn’t actually disbelieve or withhold judgment on whether her belief about the orange before was formed in a reliable way, no defeater is generated. So let’s suppose Sarah fails either to consider the matter of whether her belief about the orange was reliably formed, or that, if she does consider it, she finds herself unable to do anything other than believe it was reliably formed, notwithstanding her skeptical theism. Then Sarah’s skeptical theism fails to generate a defeater for her belief. And so, assuming the relevant externalist conditions for knowledge are met, Sarah can still know there’s an orange present.

 

Does the above suggestion allow a skeptical theist successfully to deal with the Pandora’s box objection? I don’t see that it does. Let’s return to Olly’s orange for a moment. Suppose that, having accepted the backstory about Olly and his urn, I nevertheless continue to believe that my belief that there’s an orange on the table before me is reliably formed. On Bergmann's characterisation of defeat, given that I too fail to disbelieve or withhold on whether my belief was reliably formed, my belief remains undefeated. So, given my belief is undefeated, can I reasonably take myself to know there’s an orange present?

 

Intuitively not. True my belief about the orange remains undefeated (given Bergmann’s characterisation). But, given my acceptance of the backstory about Olly and his urn (that Olly has the means to deceive me, did deceive me if he picked a black ball from his urn, and I'm in the dark about whether he picked a black ball), surely I should consider my belief defeated. And if I should consider it defeated, then I shouldn’t suppose I commonsensically know it to be true. I should be skeptical about that orange.

 

But then similarly, if skeptical theism has the consequence that Sarah should, on reflection, consider her belief about the orange defeated, then she shouldn’t suppose she commonsensically knows there’s an orange before her either. Sarah should be skeptical about her orange. And, given his skeptical theism, Bergmann should be skeptical about his.[5]

 

Here’s a second suggestion as to how their externalism might allow skeptical theists to deal with the Pandora’s box objection. When introducing the notion of defeat above, I mentioned that we might question the reliability of our intuitions with respect to widget and other cases in which it’s usually supposed that an undercutting defeater has been generated. Maria Lasonen Aarnio argues that externalists should take seriously the suggestion that knowledge can be retained even in the face of seemingly strong defeating evidence.

 

Suppose, for example, that I judge the widgets are red based on visual appearance. I then come to possess strong evidence that there’s red lighting in play that makes non-red things look red. Suppose that, despite my acquiring this new evidence, I nevertheless stick with my belief that the widgets are red. And suppose that, as a matter of fact, the new evidence is misleading - in fact there is no red lighting in play and the widgets really are as they appear to be. Then, according to Lasonen Aarnio, I may still know the widgets are red. For it may be that the relevant externalist conditions on knowledge are satisfied (so, for example, the method by which I arrive at my belief may still be safe[6]).

 

So why do we intuit that knowledge is lost in such cases? Because, suggests Lasonen Aarnio, the policy of continuing to believe, given the new evidence, is unreasonable. But, suggests Lasonen Aarnio, it doesn't follow from the fact that my continued belief is unreasonable that I don't know. This is an example of what Lasonen Aarnio calls unreasonable knowledge.

 

In what sense is my continued belief unreasonable? Lasonen Aarnio suggests reasonableness

is at least largely a matter of managing one’s beliefs through the adoption of policies that are generally knowledge conducive, thereby manifesting dispositions to know and avoid false belief across a wide range of normal cases. Subjects who stubbornly stick to their beliefs in the face of new evidence manifest dispositions that are bad given the goal of knowledge or even of true belief.’ ((2010) 2)

Consider, for example, the rule or method of belief formation that tells you to believe that p when you see that p even in the presence of good evidence for thinking that your senses are not to be trusted. This method is, in a sense, good, in that if you follow it, beliefs obtained as a result will be safe (for, given you can see that p only if p is true, the policy can't produce a false belief).

However, the above method is epistemically a bad method to adopt, suggests Lasonen Aarnio, because adopting it results in a bad disposition. Lasonen Aarnio notes that a 'subject who adopts this method is also disposed to believe p when she merely seems to see that p in the presence of evidence for thinking that her senses are not to be trusted' (2010, 14 my italics). But then, if a subject were to adopt the method, they would end up believing p in a significant proportion of cases in which the evidence that their senses are not to be trusted is not misleading. So while the method is indeed safe, its adoption results in dispositions that are not knowledge conducive:

This is why the rule believe p when you see that p in the presence of evidence for thinking that your senses are not to be trusted is not part of a policy that is knowledge conducive in the intended sense. A reasonable subject would not adopt or follow such a rule, even though it is success entailing. (2010, 15)

 

On Lasonen Aarnio's view, someone presented with evidence that the method by which they acquired their original belief is untrustworthy should withhold belief. If they fail to withhold, they are being (in Lasonen Aarnio's sense) unreasonable. They can be properly criticised for sticking with their original belief. But that's not to say they don't know.

 

So, if Lasonon Aarnio is right, perhaps I might continue to know that there’s an orange on the table even after I'm presented with the evidence about Olly and his holographic projector. If I continue to believe there’s an orange there, and it so happens that Olly's holographic projector is not deceptively employed (i.e. my belief is actually a product of a safe method), I can still know there's on orange present. But then can't the skeptical theist suggest that, for much the same reason, Sarah’s skeptical theism fails to generate a defeater for her belief that there’s an orange before her. Just so long as Sarah continues to believe there’s an orange there, she might similarly continue to know (assuming the relevant externalist conditions - e.g. safety conditions - on knowledge are met).

 

Of course the Pandora’s box objection is not so easily dealt with. Even on Lasonen Aarnio’s view, it remains unreasonable for me to believe that there’s an orange on the table given the new evidence concerning Olly and his holographic projector. Whether or not my belief is defeated (it may not be), and whether or not I know there's an orange before me (perhaps I do), I should revise my belief about the orange given the new evidence. It's unreasonable for me not to withhold belief, not to become skeptical. But then, if the analogy drawn between Olly’s orange and skeptical theist’s position is correct, it's similarly unreasonable for Sarah to believe there’s an orange before her given her skeptical theism. Whether or not Sarah knows there’s an orange present (and she might), her skeptical theism should lead her to be skeptical about that orange. For, just as in Olly's orange, she has reason to distrust the method by which she acquired her belief.

 

Here’s a third and final suggestion how externalism might allow skeptical theists to deal with the Pandora’s box objection. As we have just seen, the proponent of the Pandora’s Box objection may insist that, whether or not Sarah knows there's an orange before her, her skeptical theism should lead her to be skeptical about that orange and indeed about the external world more generally. An externalist may resist that conclusion by maintaining that what one should or shouldn’t believe depends on ones cognitive design plan (which specifies how ones cognitive faculties are supposed to work)[7], and it may be that God has designed our cognitive faculties in such a way that, while local skepticism about the orange is appropriate in Olly’s orange, we should never embrace global skepticism about the external world, not even if we have been presented with logically impeccable arguments for being globally skeptical (notice that, given we do indeed inhabit a world of the sort we seem to see around us, this particular cognitive design plan may even be aimed at truth). In Sarah’s case, unlike in Olly’s orange, it’s not just belief in the presence of an orange that’s threatened by her skeptical theism, but all her beliefs about the external world. But if Sarah’s cognitive design plan is such that no argument, no matter how good, should ever lead her to embrace that sort of skepticism, then her skeptical theism shouldn’t lead her to embrace it. The proponent of the Pandora’s box objection is mistaken in supposing otherwise.

 

The above response muddles two varieties of ‘should’. The proponent of the Pandora’s box objection insists that, given her skeptical theism, Sarah should embrace skepticism about the external world, in the sense that this is what logic dictates. Now Sarah’s cognitive design plan may be such that she should never accept such a skeptical conclusion, irrespective of the strength of any argument for it. But if the force of an argument is such that, logically speaking, Sarah should be skeptical about the external world, then, surely, under those circumstances, Sarah’s design plan requires that she believe illogically. Sarah should, logically speaking, be skeptical, irrespective of what her design plan dictates. But then, if the Pandora's box objection is that Sarah should embrace skepticism about the external world in the sense that this is what her skeptical theism logically requires of her, then the above response clearly fails to engage with that objection. It's that last italicised 'should' that proponents of the Pandora's box objection are presumably insisting upon, irrespective of what Sarah's cognitive design plan says she should do.

 

In short, I do not yet see how the resources provided by epistemic externalism allow a skeptical theist like Bergmann to deal effectively with the Pandora’s box objection.

 

7. Conclusion

 

Bergmann attempts to deal with the Pandora’s box objection to skeptical theism by appealing to commonsensism and the thought that beliefs grounded in simple perceptual experience and memory provide us with a secure basis from which we may then establish that God lacks an all-things-considered good reason to deceive us about such things. I have explained why, as it stands, that particular solution fails. I then examined a number of other suggestions as to how the skeptical theist might deal with the Pandora’s box objection - in particular, by appealing to (i) God’s moral perfection, and/or (ii) externalist thinking about defeat. None of the examined suggestions prove successful. It seems to me that, currently, there is no satisfactory skeptical theist response to the Pandora's box objection.

 

References

 

Alston, W. (1991). The inductive argument from evil and the human cognitive condition. In J. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical Perspectives 5: Philosophy of Religion (pp. 29-67). Atascadero CA: Ridgeview.

(1996). Some (temporarily) final thoughts on evidential arguments from evil. In Howard-Snyder (ed.) (1996) (pp.311-32).

 

Beaudoin, J. (2005). Skepticism and the skeptical theist. Faith and Philosophy, 22, 42-56.

 

Bergmann, M. (1997). Internalism, externalism, and the no-defeater condition. Synthese, 110, 399-417.

(2001). Skeptical theism and Rowe's new evidential argument from evil. Noûs, 35, 278-96

(2005). Defeaters and higher-level requirements. Philosophical Quarterly, 55, 419-436.

(2006). Justification Without Awareness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

(2009). Skeptical theism and the problem of evil. In T. Flint and M. Rea (eds.) Oxford Handbook to Philosophical Theology (pp. 374-99). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

(2012). Commonsense skeptical theism. In K. Clark and M. Rea (eds.) Science, Religion, and Metaphysics: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga (pp. 9-30). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

Feldman, R. (2005). Respecting the evidence. Philosophical Perspectives, 19, 95-119, 

 

Fitzpatrick, F. J. (1981). The onus of proof in arguments about the problem of evil. Religious Studies, 17, 19-38.

 

Gale, R. (1996). Some difficulties in theistic treatments of evil. In Howard-Snyder (1996), 206-18.

 

Haldane, E, and Ross, G.R.T. (trans.). (1967). The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

 

Howard-Snyder, D. (ed.) (1996). The Evidential Argument from Evil. Indiana: Indiana University Free Press.

1996a. Introduction to Howard-Snyder (ed.) (1996).

 

Lasonen Aarnio, M. (2010). Unreasonable Knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives, 24, 1-21.

 

Maitzen, S. (2009). Skeptical theism and moral obligation. International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion, 65, 93-103.

 

McBrayer, J. (2012). Are skeptical theists really skeptics? Sometimes yes and sometimes no. International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion, 72, 3-16.

 

McBrayer, J. and Swenson, P. (2012). Skepticism and the argument from divine hiddenness. Religious Studies, 48, 129-150.

 

Moore, G.E. 1(959). A defence of common sense. In his Philosophical Papers. London: George Allen and Unwin.

 

Plantinga, A. (1996). Epistemic probability and evil, in Howard-Snyder (ed.) (1996), 69-96.

 

Russell, B. (1996). Defenseless. In Howard-Snyder (1996), 193-205.

 

Segal, A. (2011). Skeptical theism and divine truths. Religious Studies, 47, 85-95.

 

Van Inwagen, P. (1996). The problem of evil, air, and silence. In Howard Snyder (ed.) (1996), 151-174.

 

Wilkes, I. (2009). Skeptical theism and empirical unfalsifiability. Faith and Philosophy, 26, 64-76.

 

Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Wykstra, S. (1984). The Humean obstacle to evidential arguments from suffering: on avoiding the evils of  ‘appearance’. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 16, 73-93.

(1996). Rowe's noseeum arguments from evil. In Howard-Snyder (1996), 126-50.

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[1] Proponents of a skeptical theist response to the evidential argument from evil include Alston (1991, 1996), Bergmann (2001, 2009), Fitzpatrick (1981), Howard-Snyder (1996a), McBrayer and Swenson (2012), Plantinga (1996), Segal (2011), van Inwagen (1996), and Wykstra (1984, 1996).

[2] After Wykstra (1996): ‘We don’t see ‘um so they probably ain’t there.’

[3] See for example Russell (1996), Gale (1996).

[4] As already noted, the accuracy of such intuitions has been question. I address this worry towards the end of this paper.

[5] In fact, there’s a prima facie case for saying, not just that Bergmann shouldn’t consider himself commonsensically to know there an orange present, but also that he doesn’t know there’s orange present. In Justification Without Awareness (2006) Bergmann considers a case where he supposes a subject, Jill, clearly should consider her belief defeated given her background knowledge. Jill bets her brother that both their parents are out of town that day given what she’s been told by a reputable source. Jill knows that if she wins she gets $300 that will enable her to buy a bike. Jill and her brother now see both parents walk in, yet Jill continues to believe she’ll be able to buy that bike. Bergmann observes that Jill fails ‘to put two and two together’ in the way she should. He concludes that while Jill’s belief is not defeated, neither is it known. This is because, on Bergmann’s view, Jill’s ‘defeater system is not functioning properly’ (2006: 171), this being another Bergmannian condition on knowledge. Someone like Jill should, in a case like this, ‘put two and two together’.

            The proponent of the Pandora’s box objection will presumably point out that Bergmann’s own defeater system would appear not to be functioning properly if Bergmann similarly fails to ‘put two and two together’ and conclude that his perceptually grounded belief that there’s an orange before him is defeated given his skeptical theism has the consequence that he’s in the dark about whether God has an all-things-considered good reason to deceive Bergmann about that orange. Our critic will insist Bergmann should suppose his belief is defeated given his acceptance of skeptical theism in just the same way that I should consider my belief there’s an orange before me is defeated given I accept the backstory about Olly and his urn. Bergmann may insist there is some relevant disanalogy between his situation and mine in Olly’s Orange, but the onus is presumably now on Bergmann to explain what the disanalogy is. There is at least a prima facie case here for saying Bergmann does not know there’s an orange before him. However, see my final comments re Lasonen Aarnio on defeat.

[6] Safety conditions on knowledge are associated particularly with Williamson, Sosa, and Pritchard. A simple example of a safety condition says S knows P only if S is safe from error; that is, there must be no risk that S believes falsely in a similar case. So, for example, if Ted looks at a stopped clock when it happens to read the right time, his belief is not safe, because his belief could easily have been false. For an example of the safety view see Williamson (2000).

[7] Bergmann offers a 'proper function' theory of justification in which cognitive design plans play a key role. See Bergmann (2006 chpt. 5). Bergmann does not actually offer the response to the Pandora's box objection that I sketch here. It's merely a response of a sort that I anticipate Bergmann or other skeptical theists might yet make.

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