Wright's Private Language Argument Refuted

(currently unpublished) copyright to myself. Feel free to link but do not repost.

ABSTRACT: Wright’s Private Language Argument Refuted

Crispin Wright has developed a novel take on the private language argument presented by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations PI 258-60. Wright’s private language argument is ingenious and important, and it has not, to date, been refuted. In this paper I refute Wright’s argument, pointing out that it commits the fallacy of equivocation (it trades on an ambiguity in his use of the phrase “reason to believe”). While there may be a cogent private language argument presented in PI 258-60, Wright has failed to hit upon it.

PLANTINGA'S BELIEF-CUM-DESIRE ARGUMENT REFUTED

PLANTINGA’S BELIEF-CUM-DESIRE ARGUMENT REFUTED
Stephen Law

FORTHCOMING IN RELIGIOUS STUDIES. NOTE THAT CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS NOW OWN COPYRIGHT.

Abstract

In Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga develops an argument designed to show that naturalism is self-defeating. One component of this larger argument is what I call Plantinga’s belief-cum-desire argument, which is intended to establish something more specific: that if the content of our beliefs does causally effect behaviour (that is to say, semantic content is not epiphenomenal), and if naturalism and current evolutionary doctrine are correct, then the probability that we possess reliable cognitive mechanisms must be either inscrutable or low. This paper aims to refute Plantinga’s belief-cum-desire argument.

THE EVIL GOD CHALLENGE - forthcoming in Religious Studies

POSTSCRIPT:

My Paper "The Evil God Challenge" is now available online at the CUP journals page http://journals.cambridge.org/repo_A72V8TEm

This is the final, published version, appearing in Religious Studies shortly. PDF VERSION.

THE EVIL GOD CHALLENGE

Stephen Law

NB Note COPYRIGHT RESTS WITH CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. This is forthcoming in Religious Studies.

Abstract


This paper develops a challenge to theism. The challenge is to explain why the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and all-good god should be considered significantly more reasonable than the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and all-evil god. Theists typically dismiss the evil god hypothesis out of hand because of the problem of good – there is surely too much good in the world for it to be the creation of such a being. But then why doesn’t the problem of evil provide equally good grounds for dismissing belief in a good god? I develop this evil god challenge in detail, anticipate several replies, and correct errors made in earlier discussions of the problem of good.

EXTRACT: from chpt 3, The War For Children's Minds

The positive side to Liberal education

Let’s now look in more detail at the Liberal alternative to Authority-based moral and religious education.

One way of being Liberal-with-a-capital-L would of course be to ignore morality altogether, to abandon each child to invent his or her own morality from scratch, within a moral vacuum. That’s not the method advocated here. This book recommends a much more specific sort of approach, an approach that involves a training in and the fostering of what might broadly be termed “thinking skills and virtues”. Children should be encouraged to scrutinize their own beliefs and explore other points of view. While not wanting to be overly prescriptive, I would suggest that skills to be cultivated should at least include the ability to:

Honderich and the Curse of Epiphenomenalism

Honderich and the Curse of Epiphenomenalism

Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 13 numbers 7-8, 2006, pp61-77

Stephen Law

In Radical Externalism, Ted Honderich offers an ingenious and radical new solution to the problem of consciousness – a solution that promises, among other things, to do justice to two important features of consciousness – to both its subjectivity and its causal efficacy.

According to Honderich, the main alternatives to his own radical externalism are certain forms of dualism, or, as he puts it, “spiritualism”, and “devout physicalism”. Honderich’s central argument for radical externalism is that it succeeds in respecting those features of consciousness to which these two main alternatives fail to do justice. It is, therefore, the superior theory.

But is radical externalism superior? Does it have this advantage over its two main rivals?

I don’t believe it does. The central argument of this paper is that radical externalism falls foul of much the same kinds of problems concerning causal interaction that plague spiritualism. Indeed, ironically, it turns out that radical externalism is vulnerable to a similar objection to that which Honderich himself cleverly levelled again anomalous monism almost a quarter century ago.

But before we get to that objection, let’s begin by briefly outlining what Honderich takes to be the two main alternatives to his own theory – spiritualism and devout materialism – and examining their alleged failings.

Animation script

INTRODUCTORY SEQUENCE

LIVE ACTION: CAMP THESPIAN SITTING IN VELVET ARMCHAIR IN LIBRARY, WITH HUGE LEATHER BOUND BOOK. ROARING FIRE AND SIDE-TABLE. SPOOKILY LIT AMID DARKNESS BY SPOTLIGHT. BIT LIKE OPENING OF ROCKY HORROR PICTURE SHOW.

THE NARRATOR [WE SLOWLY ZOOM IN]: Ah, you’ve arrived. Welcome! Welcome to The Philosophy Files! – where we encounter some of the greatest mysteries of all!

FLUFFY WHITE CAT (ANIMATED?) APPEARS ON MANTELPIECE AND TEETERS ALONG IT.

But be warned. Thinking philosophically can be disturbing – frightening even. We’re going to be thinking without a safety net. [CAT SLIPS, SAVES ITSELF] Indeed, we will often be teetering on the very edge of sanity! [CAT FALLS OFF MANTELPIECE – CRASH!]

For we’re embarking upon a journey, a journey into the unknown – a journey to… the Outer Limits of thought. [SCREEN GOES TO INTERFERENCE] THAN SHRINKS TO POINT AND VANISHES LEAVING DARK SCREEN, LIKE IN OLD TWILIGHT ZONE SHOW [MAYBE PLAY TWILIGHT ZONE THEME?]

THE NARRATOR: Allow me to introduce…the philosopher!

Five Private Language Arguments (International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12, no. 2 (2004))

Abstract

This paper distinguishes five key interpretations of the argument presented by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations I, §258. I also argue that on none of these five interpretations is the argument cogent. The paper is primarily concerned with the most popular interpretation of the argument: that which that makes it rest upon the principle that one can be said to follow a rule only if there exists a “useable criterion of successful performance” (Pears) or “operational standard of correctness” (Glock) for its correct application. This principle, I suggest, is untrue. The private language argument upon which it rests therefore fails.

FIVE PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS

Section §258 of Part I of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (henceforth PI §258) is one of the best-known and most controversial passages of that book. Many philosophers - including Malcolm Budd, John Canfeild, Hans-Johann Glock, P.M.S. Hacker, Paul Johnston, Anthony Kenny, Norman Malcolm, Marie McGinn and David Pears - claim to discern within PI §258 and the surrounding text a powerful argument against the possibility of a necessarily private language. Others dismiss the argument, typically on the grounds that it is verificationist.

My aim in this paper is twofold. The first aim is clarity. The dispute over whether the private language argument of PI §258 is cogent has been confused by the fact there are now five main interpretations of PI §258 currently on offer, each interpretation presenting a fundamentally different argument. I will set out and distinguish clearly all five private language arguments. My second aim is to explain why none of these arguments is, as it stands, cogent.

I begin by setting out what all the commentators discussed in this paper believe to be the target of PI §258: the suggestion that one might possess a necessarily private language.